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National Treasure: A Comparative
Analysis of Domestic Laws
Criminalizing Illicit Excavation
and Exportation of
Archaeological Objects
by Kimberly L. Alderman*
and Chelsey S. Dahm**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Some participantsin the illicit antiquitiestrade
are more equal than others.
For every good that is subject to governmental regulation, there is a
corresponding underground economy.' Archaeological materials are no
exception to this rule.2 Antiquities have been heavily sought after and
collected since Roman times.? As the trade of antiquities becomes more

* Author ofArchaeoLaw (http://archaeolaw.com), an online resource for news pertaining
to cultural property and archaeology law. University of Maryland at College Park (B.A.,
2001); Howard University School of Law (J.D., 2006); ARCA International Art Crime
Program (M.A., 2010). Copyright by Author.
** University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire (B.B.A., 2010); University of Wisconsin Law
School (J.D., 2012).
1. Michael Michaely, A GeometricalAnalysis of Black-Market Behavior, 44 AM. ECON.
REV. 627, 627 (1954).
2. See Kimberly L. Alderman, HonorAmongst Thieves: Organized Crime and the Illicit
Antiquities Trade, 45 IND. L. REV. 601, 624-25 (2011) [hereinafter Alderman, Honor
Amongst Thieves].
3. The Acquisition of Cultural Property: Collecting and Looting, ARCHAEOLOGY AND
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, http//pcwww.liv.ac.uk/-Sinclair/ALGY399_Site/acquisition.html.
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global and sophisticated, so does the corresponding underground
economy.'
The global antiquities trade has been referred to as a "grey market,"
because it is not distinctively "black" or "white."5 Many antiquities are
discovered through illicit excavations and transported to the country of
their final purchaser through illicit exportation.' Although the majority
of antiquities transactions are illicit,' the face of the global antiquities
trade-auction houses and sophisticated art dealers-gives the industry
a "patina of legitimacy."
Antiquities are labeled as licit or illicit based upon whether the
excavator and exporter had the appropriate permits.' Permits are an
important consideration because tainted objects do not, on their face,
carry the appearance of having been illegally obtained or exported.'o
Ascertaining the licit or illicit nature of an object through permits is
far from conclusive. Provenance paperwork establishes an antiquity's
lineage by documenting all known previous owners, excavation permits,
and export permits.n Even with paperwork documenting an antiquity's
entire life it is difficult for auction houses to determine when the
paperwork is forged or manipulated."

4. Id.
5. See Blythe A. Bowman, Transnational Crimes Against Culture: Looting at
ArchaeologicalSites and the "Grey"Market in Antiquities, 24 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 225,
226 (2008); Simon Mackenzie, The Market as Criminal and Criminals in the Market:
Reducing Opportunitiesfor OrganisedCrime in the InternationalAntiquities Market, in
CRIME IN THE ART AND ANTIQUITIES WORLD: ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING IN CULTURAL PROPERTY
69, 71-72 (Stefano Manacorda & Duncan Chappell eds., 2011) [hereinafter CRIME IN THE
ART AND ANTIQUITIES WORLD].
6. See PETER WATSON, SOTHEBY'S: THE INSIDE STORY 304 (1997) (indicating that
studies show that about 90% of antiquities sold through auction houses are illegally
excavated or exported).
7. See Stefano Manacorda & Duncan Chappell, From Cairo to Vienna and Beyond:

Contemporary Perspectives on the Dialogue About Protecting Cultural Artefacts from
Plunder,in CRIME IN THE ART AND ANTIQUITIES WORLD, supra note 5, at 6.
8. See NEIL BRODIE, JENNY DOOLE & PETER WATSON, THE MCDONALD INST. FOR
ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESEARCH, STEALING HISTORY: THE ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURAL
MATERIAL 1, 29 (2000), availableat http://www.stanford.edu/group/chr/stealinghistory.pdf
("Looted antiquities then acquire a patina of legitimacy when ultimately they are sold,
without provenance, by dealers and auction houses.").

9. See generally Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 612.
10. Kimberly Alderman, The EthicalTrade in CulturalProperty:Ethics and Law in the
Antiquity Auction Industry, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 549, 560 (2008) [hereinafter

Alderman, Ethical Trade].
11. See THE THAMES AND HUDSON DICTIONARY OF ART TERMS 154 (E. Lucie-Smith ed.,
1984).

12. See Richardo J. Elia, Digging Up Dirt: An Antiquities Case UnearthsCorruption,
WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2002), http//www.opinionjournal.com/la/?id=110001867.
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Whether licit or illicit, the vast majority of antiquities share the same
distribution ladder'3 as shown below in a pictorial representation of
this path.

Collectors
Dealers
Middlemen
Excavators

The path of an antiquity in the modern day begins with excavation-the process of discovering and removing an antiquity from the place
where it has rested for many years.14 The people who first discover
and unearth antiquities are called excavators, and they occupy the
bottom rung of the distribution ladder." The countries from which
antiquities generally originate-sometimes called source nations'--usually have patrimony statutes under which the government
claims ownership of unearthed cultural objects." These laws prohibit
citizens from searching for or removing antiquities without a license
from the government." Therefore, excavations are illicit whenever
antiquities are discovered through unregulated or otherwise illegal
excavations." While most illicit excavators are motivated by poverty,
in some areas there is substantial profit to be made in plundering.2 0

13. Alderman, HonorAmongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 615, 615 n.112 (discussing the
distribution ladder for antiquities).
14. PHILIP BARKER, TECHNIQUES OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXCAVATION 13 (3d ed. 1993).
15. See Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 606.
16. Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics ofAntiquities Looting and a ProposedLegal
Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 385 (1995).
17. Simon Mackenzie, Illicit Antiquities, TRAFFICKING CULTuRE (Aug. 17, 2012),
http://traffickingculture.org/encyclopedia/terminology/illicit-antiquities.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. See Borodkin, supra note 16, at 378, 406.
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Illicit excavators generally lack the means and connections to transfer
their finds to collectors, who tend to reside outside of source countries."
This is because most source countries impose export restrictions on
In these instances, to transport antiquities across
antiquities.22
national borders, archaeological objects must necessarily be illegally
exported.23 Accordingly, the illicit excavator's role in the global antiquity
trade is limited to unearthing objects and selling them to middlemen.2 '
For the purposes of this discussion, middlemen include wholesalers
and traffickers. 25 Both are classified as middlemen on the second rung
of the antiquities distribution ladder.2 6
The majority of illicit excavators sell to wholesalers." Wholesalers
are essential to the illicit antiquities trade because they facilitate the
smuggling of antiquities into "market countries" -countries where
antiquities tend to be sold to their ultimate owners.2 8 Specifically,
wholesalers find traffickers or dealers for the illegally excavated
antiquities.' They may also arrange for false bills of provenance to aid
traffickers in smuggling antiquities out of the source nation or into an
intermediate or market nation.a" Wholesalers make much larger

21. See Alderman, HonorAmongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 614-16.
22. Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, The Smuggling of Art, and the Art of
Smuggling: Uncovering the Illicit Trade in CulturalProperty and Antiques (Nat'1 Bureau
of Econ Research, Working Paper No. 13446, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/pa
pers/w13446.
23. Fisman & Wei, supra note 22.
24. See Amir Ganor, Director, Robbery Prevention Division, ARCHAEOLOGY (2010),
availableat httpJ/www.archive.archaeology.org/israel-antiquities-authority/ganor.html.
25. As the Author noted previously in Honor Amongst Thieves, in literature on the
illicit antiquities trade, the terms "middleman" and "wholesaler" are generally synonymous,
and fall into a different category from "traffickers." Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves,
supra note 2, at 614-18. When wholesalers employ crews of diggers or engage in trafficking
themselves, the general distinctions between wholesalers and traffickers are challenged.
Id. Regardless, wholesalers and traffickers share the middle rung of the distribution ladder
for illicit antiquities. Id. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Article, "middlemen" refers
to wholesalers and traffickers generally, and "wholesaler" refers to the person to whom
criminal excavators sell their goods.
26. See Figure A-1.
27. See Alderman, HonorAmongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 615-16.
28. See id.; Nate Mealy, Note, Mediation's Potential Role in International Cultural
PropertyDisputes, 26 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 169, 176 (2011); Cristina Ruiz, My
Life as a Tombarolo, ART NEWSPAPER No. 112 (Mar. 2001), availableat http://www.museum-security.org/tombarolo.htm.
29. See Chauncey D. Steele IV, The MorgantinaTreasure:Italy's Quest for Repatriation
of Looted Artifacts, 23 SuFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 667, 680-81 (2000).
30. Id. at 681.
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financial gains than do illicit excavators.31 Occasionally, wholesalers
employ their own teams of diggers to perform the illegal excavations.2
While some wholesalers move the illicit antiquities across country
borders themselves, many instead opt to use professional traffickers."
Trafficking itself is the act of illegally transporting an object across
national borders.3 ' These objects may have been lawfully unearthed
and then stolen, or simply lawfully unearthed but not permitted to leave
the source nation.3 1 Traffickers pass the antiquities along to dealers,
who serve as intermediaries between wholesalers and end purchasers of
Traffickers smuggle illicit antiquities across
illicit antiquities."
national borders or from remote to urban areas within the source
nation.
Dealers occupy the third rung of the distribution ladder.38 Through
dealers, antiquities that have successfully been brought into a market
country are sold to their final owners." Illicit antiquities often pass
through several dealers before they are eventually sold to private or
institutional collectors.o Antiquities may travel through several types
of specialized dealers, including antique shops,4 1 auction houses,4 2
specific collectors or curators, 3 private dealers," or even eBay.'

31. Juliana V. Campagna, War or Peace: It is Time for the United States to Ratify the
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflicts, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 271, 286 (2005); Asif Efrat, A Theory of Internationally
Regulated Goods, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1466, 1479 (2009).
32. See Ganor, supra note 24.
33. Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 616.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 617.
36. Id. at 616-18. For the purposes of this discussion, end purchasers of antiquities are
referred to as "collectors."
37. See Steele, supra note 29, at 681.
38. See Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 618.
39. See Peter Brems & Wim Van den Eynde, Blood Antiques (Journeyman Pictures
television broadcast Oct. 8, 2009), transcript available at http://www.journeyman.tv/?
lid=59906&tmpl=transcript.
40. See Gregory Elich, Spoils of War: The Antiquities Trade and the Looting of Iraq,
CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALISATION (Jan. 3, 2004), http://www.globalresearch.ca/artic
les/ELI401A.html.
41. See Brems & Van den Eynde, supra note 39.
42. Alderman, EthicalTrade, supra note 10.
43. Brems & Van den Eynde, supra note 39.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Patrick Tyler, Museum Asks EBay to Block Some Sales, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct.
30, 2004), availableat http://www.nytimes.con/2004/10/30/arts/30trea.html?_r=1&ref=pat
ricketyler.
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The last rung on the distribution ladder is reserved for the final
owners of antiquities. Two large classes of final owners are private
collectors and institutional collectors."
Private collectors tend to be wealthy, "high society" people." Their
affluence allows them to pay premium prices for objects that generated
only small profits for the local people in source countries who unearthed
them. 8 Collectors are able to individually sidestep prosecution for
collecting illicit antiquities and use their collective influence to lobby for
less restrictive import regulations. 9
Another class of final owners is institutional collectors, typically
Historically, museums have participated in the illicit
museums.
antiquities trade as well, even if inadvertently.o A large part of this
participation is the collection of poorly documented antiquities with
questionable provenance.s' However, many museums have responded
to increasing pressure to make acquisition and loan policies more
stringent.52 Similarly, museums are becoming increasingly likely to
return objects on ethical grounds, even when source countries lack a
legal basis on which to premise repatriation demands." Although some
museums may require certain items to have paperwork of acceptable
provenance,5 4 it is difficult to know when the paperwork is forged or
manipulated."

46. See Alderman, HonorAmongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 622.
47. See Brems & Van den Eynde, supra note 39 ("This is a world of its own, one that
doesn't take to being investigated. It's a high society world. If you'd really start digging
in the art world, heads of people in high places would roll. There's also the aristocracy,
some of whom also have collections, of so-called 'blood antiquities.'").
48. See Borodkin, supra note 16, at 406.
49. See Elich, supra note 40.
50. Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 622; see Randy Kennedy,
Museum Defends Antiquities Collecting, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012108/13/arts/design/cleveland-museum-buys-antiquities-stirsethics-debates.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&src=rechp.
51. See Kennedy, supra note 50.
52. Aaron Kyle Briggs, Consequences of the Met-Italy Accord for the International
Restitution of CulturalProperty, 7 CHI. J. INVL L. 623, 628-29 (2007).
53. See BRODIE, DOOLE & WATSON, supranote 8, at 27 ("[I]n the spring of 1999 [Medici]
came to an agreement with the Italian carabinierito return three fragments of a bowl
made by the well-known ancient potter Euphronios. The other fragments of this bowl were
in the J. Paul Getty Museum in Los Angeles, and . .. the museum voluntarily returned
what it possessed to Italy.").
54. See Hans Kennon, Take a Picture,It May Last Longer if Guggenheim Becomes the
Law of the Land: The Repatriationof Fine Art, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 373, 382-83 n.45
(1996).

55. Alderman, Ethical Trade, supra note 10, at 560.
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The distribution ladder for licit and illicit antiquities exemplifies the
intertwined nature of the "black" and "white" market aspects of the
global antiquities trade. Because there is not a separate channel of
distribution for an antiquity based on whether it is of licit or illicit
origin, its route from excavator to final owner may display aspects of
both." As with any underground economy, the nature of the illicit
trade breeds inequality amongst its participants."
II.

INEQUALITY IN THE ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES TRADE

The illicit antiquities distribution ladder" does more than just show
how antiquities move in commerce from beneath the earth to their final
owners. It also shows a continuum from poor to rich, from politically
powerless to politically empowered, from culturally connected to
disconnected, and from criminally vulnerable to insulated from liability.
A.

Moral Right to Participatein the Illicit Antiquities '-ade
Arguably, those at the bottom of the illicit antiquities distribution
ladder have the greatest moral right to participate in the illicit
antiquities trade. Looters sometimes have a direct ancestral tie to the
crafts of excavated materials.59 They often have few employment
options, as source countries are more likely to be economically depressed
than market countries.o Essentially, the money illicit excavators earn
from unearthing antiquities often goes to feed their families."
The same cannot be said of those at the top of the ladder, who
arguably have the least moral right to participate in the illicit antiquities trade. Private collectors tend to be wealthy, "high society" people.62
They are culturally disconnected from the archaeological materials that

56. See generally Borodkin, supra note 16, at 385.
57. See generally Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 606, 615.
58. See Figure A-1.
59. See, e.g., David Matsuda, The Ethics of Archaeology, Subsistence Digging, and
Artifact Looting in Latin America: Point, Muted Counterpoint, 1 INVL J. CULTURAL PROP.
87, 88 (1998) ("Many of Latin America's indigenous peoples see themselves as the
legitimate heirs to both seeds and artifacts, which are conceived of as ancestors' gifts, given
to humanity by real or mythological patrons to be harvested, or excavated, as it were, by
later generations.").
60. See Ruiz, supra note 28 (recording one criminal excavator's explanation that,
"[Tihere's no alternative for me or for my men. We work to put food on the table for our
families ... [wie are all unemployed."); see The Acquisition of Cultural Property:Collecting
and Looting, supra note 3 (describing the flow of antiquities from poor to wealthy nations).
61. Ruiz, supra note 28.
62. Brems & Van den Eynde, supra note 39.
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they purchase" and are not motivated by economic necessity, as are
the illicit excavators discussed above. Whereas illicit excavators
sometimes feel that excavation is the only means through which they
can provide for their families, collectors tend to purchase antiquities for
enjoyment or investment.6
B. Profit from Participationin the 'rade
Antiquities tend to come from developing nations.6 Illicit excavators
tend to be impoverished, often indigenous, and usually marginalized
people." The further one moves up the illicit antiquities distribution
ladder, the more likely participants are wealthy and in a developed
nation."
Illicit excavators make the least profit of all the participants in the
illicit antiquities trade. Studies have consistently shown that looters
receive only 1% - 2%, or less, of the final selling price of looted materials.68 Wholesalers and traffickers make significantly more than that,
but dealers receive the lion's share of the total profit made off of any
particular antiquity."
It is also worth noting that dealers trade in many objects, as opposed
to the occasional few traded by most illicit excavators.o This allows for

63. See Jason C. Roberts, The Protectionof Indigenous Populations'CulturalProperty
in Peru, Mexico and the United States, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 327, 330 (1997)
(explaining that after illicit antiquities are looted, they are moved across international
borders, away from their nations of origin, to their ultimate purchasers).
64. See generally Why Buy Art?, ECONOMIST (June 22, 2012), http://www.economist.
com/blogs/prospero/2012/06/art-market.
65. See Alia Szopa, HoardingHistory: A Survey ofAntiquity Looting and Black Market
Trade, 13 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 55, 60 (2004) ("Antiquities are heavily looted in these
developing countries which are often poor and in the process of developing; these countries
are also known as 'artifact-rich' or 'source' nations.").
66. See Alderman, HonorAmongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 606-07.
67. See INT'L SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CRIME PREVENTION & CRIM. JUSTICE PROGRAMME, ORGANISED CRIME IN ART AND
ANTIQUITIES 33 (Stefano Manacerda ed., 2008) ("The flow of artefacts in the antiquities
market is entirely in a direction leading from poor to rich nations.").
68. See Borodkin, supra note 16, at 378 n.10 (describing instances in Turkey and the
United States where finders received very small amounts compared to the ultimate selling
prices of a marble statue and a Mimbres pot, respectively).
69. See Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities:
Reducing the Harm, Preserving the Past, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 169, 181 (2007) ("These price
differentials demonstrate that from the source at a looted archaeological site ... to the
transit points ... to the ultimate market in [various] locations ... mark-ups for antiquities
can be a hundredfold or more.").
70. See Alderman, HonorAmongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 618 (explaining that some
antiquity dealers own antique shops, necessarily dealing in many objects); Adel H. Yahya,
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compound profit, with dealers making tens or hundreds of times more
profit than the criminal excavators."
Prosecution & Defense of Antiquities Crimes
Collectors and dealers tend to be prosecuted under the laws of the
market country where illicit antiquities are often sold to their final
owners." Meanwhile, criminal excavators and wholesalers (and, to a
lesser extent, traffickers) are likely to be prosecuted under the laws of
the source country in which the antiquity originated.
In the source nations where antiquities tend to originate, criminal
prosecutions are straightforward. The issue at trial is, usually, "Did the
defendant have a permit for excavating or trading in the antiquity?"74
In market countries, however, prosecutions are most often done through
general stolen property laws." In the United States, for instance,
prosecutions of those who buy or sell an illicit antiquity are often done
through the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA)." The prosecution
must prove the defendant knew the object was improperly excavated or
exported from its country of origin. 7 This is difficult because of the
C.

Looting and 'Salvaging'the Heritage of Palestine,PRESENT PASTS (2) (2010), available at
http://www.presentpasts.info/article/view/pp.26/48 (noting that whereas dealers in illicit
antiquities receive antiquities directly from many middlemen, illicit excavators have the
tedious task of discovering such antiquities, so they necessarily trade in fewer objects than
their dealer counterparts).
71. See Yahya, supra note 70.
72. See, e.g., Celestine Bohlen, Illicit Antiquities and a Test Case Fit for Solomon; The
Trial of a Dealer Divides the Art World, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/30/arts/illicit-antiquities-test-case-fit-for-solomon-traildealer-divides-art-world.html (discussing the trial of an antiquities dealer in New York City
for antiquities taken from Egypt).
73. See Jessica Eve Morrow, The National Stolen PropertyAct and the Return of Stolen
CulturalProperty to its Rightful Foreign Owners, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 249, 252
(2007) (explaining that most source countries have national patrimony laws that allow
them to make illicit excavation and export a crime within the antiquity's country of origin).
74. See, e.g., Derek Fincham, Why U.S. FederalCriminal Penaltiesfor Dealingin Illicit
CulturalPropertyAre Ineffective, and a PragmaticAlternative, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 597, 636-39 (2007) (discussing the United Kingdom's Export of Goods (Control) Order
1992 that "prohibits the export without a license of any goods produced more than [fifty]
years before the export").
75. Fincham, supra note 74, at 611.
76. Id. ("[TIhe NSPA has been adapted to respond to the illicit trade in antiquities.");
18 U.S.C. §§ 2311, 2314-2315 (2012).
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 ("Whoever receives [or] possesses . .. any goods . .. knowing
the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken. . . .").
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secrecy involved in antiquities transactions." In order for an antiquity
to be "stolen," the prosecuting nation must usually have an international
agreement with the country of origin to enforce the source country's
patrimony laws." Accordingly, those at the bottom of the illicit
antiquities distribution ladder are easier to prosecute than those at the
top-proving that someone lacked a permit is easier than proving that
someone knew an antiquity was illicit in character. Furthermore,
impoverished criminal excavators often live in developing countries that
are unable to provide appointed counsel.o
In contrast, those at the top of the distribution ladder-private
collectors and the representatives of institutional collectors, as well as
the dealers who service them-are more politically empowered and have
greater access to funds, which results in better access to quality defense
counsel." Many source nations do not afford indigent defendants the
right to government-funded counsel, so criminal excavators are
particularly susceptible to being prosecuted without any legal represen-

tation.8 2

III.

CULTURAL PROPERTY PENALTIES

Given the foregoing, it is clear that criminal excavators are at a
disadvantage because they face the greatest risk of prosecution and
conviction, yet stand to make the least in terms of compensatory profit
for taking that risk. Meanwhile, dealers stand to make the greatest
profit while incurring the least criminal liability." The inquiry next
turns to whether this socioeconomic disparity similarly manifests itself
in domestic criminal laws pertaining to cultural property.

78. See Fincham, supra note 74, at 611-12 ("[This element [knowing] can be extremely
difficult to establish in the context of cultural property because of the shroud of secrecy
surrounding art and antiquities transactions.").
79. Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 618 ("If a dealer or auction
house is selling an object they know to have been illegally exported from a source nation,
but their home nation does not have a bilateral agreement to enforce the export laws of
that source nation, then the transaction is legal.").
80. ERIK ANDRE ANDERSON & BIRGIT LINDsNAES, TOwARDs NEW GLOBAL STRATEGIES:
PUBLIC GOODS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 38 (2007) (explaining that in many developing countries
the state cannot provide appointed counsel).
81. Simon Mackenzie & Penny Green, Performative Regulation:A Case Study in How
Powerful People Avoid Criminal Labels, 48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 138 (describing
antiquities dealers as "powerful and influential traders").
82. Cf Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("The right of one charged with
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some
countries, but it is in ours."); Assigned Counsel, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 644 (2012),
available at http-//www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/39319/assigned-counsel.
83. See Part II.A; see also Alderman, HonorAmongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 606.
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This section compares and analyzes domestic statutory schemes in
forty-six countries that impose criminal penalties for the illicit excavation or export of antiquities.' The legislation examined for the purpose
of this Article affects criminal excavators, wholesalers, traffickers, and
dealers for actions taken in legislating countries only." The forty-six
criminal statutory schemes examined each impose fines, penalties, or
both for participation in the illicit antiquities trade within national
borders. The Authors acknowledge that research into these statutory
schemes is inherently limited by a lack of official translations, in many
instances, and the dynamic nature of the provisions themselves.
Figure A-2 shows the forty-six countries whose laws have been considered for the purposes of this analysis. Countries whose laws were
evaluated and integrated into the following analysis are shown in black,
while all other countries are shown in white.
The Authors attempted to select a cross-section of countries in terms
of relative socioeconomic and political status, but the general trend
nonetheless swayed toward more advanced countries for several reasons.
First, the Authors relied on countries for which there were acceptable
and understandable translations. To find these laws, the Authors used
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) Database of National Cultural Heritage Laws, available
online. Many of the countries with translated laws in the UNESCO
Database are countries whose legal systems parallel the American legal
system, rendering a number of the statutes easy to understand by
American attorneys.
It is worth noting that the forty-six criminal cultural property laws
that have been considered do not preclude the existence of other laws

84. Countries studied for purposes of this research are Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina,
Australia, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Croatia,
Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand,
Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States
of America.
85. A domestic law criminalizing unauthorized excavation or exportation of
archaeological materials will apply only within the borders of the enacting nation.
Accordingly, a United States law authorizing fines or prison time as a punishment for illicit
excavation will pertain only to archaeological materials unearthed within its borders. See
16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a) (2012). When this Article refers to a "country of origin," it means the
country from which an object was originally unearthed or exported from.
86. UNESCO Database of National Cultural Heritage Laws, United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), www.unesco.org/culture/
natlaws/index (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
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under which a participant in the illicit antiquities trade can be
prosecuted." However, this Article examines only those laws that are
specific to cultural property crimes, namely the illicit excavation and
exportation of antiquities.
A. General Characteristicsof Criminal Domestic Laws Pertainingto
CulturalProperty
The majority of the forty-six countries with punitive cultural property
laws allow for both fines and confinement as punishment for the illicit
excavation or export of antiquities." Five of the forty-six countries

87. For instance, in the United States, an antiquities trafficker may be prosecuted
under the NSPA, even though the NSPA does not pertain to cultural property specifically.
18 U.S.C. § 2314-2315. However, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA), 16
U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (2012), pertains to cultural property specifically and thus was
applicable and included in the analysis herein.
88. The twenty-nine countries that allow for both fines and confinement are the
following: (1) Australia,Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986, (Cth) Pt. II, Div.
1,Para. 9 (Austl.), availableat http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdflaustralia/
auiactprotmovableculthrtgell986 engorof.pdf; (2) Bahamas, Antiquities, Monuments and
Museum Act, No. 5, Pt. IV(12), VII(33Xb), (e) (1998) (Bah.), available at http://w
ww.unesco.org/culturenatlaws/media/pdfbahamas/bahamas-act-5 12-05 1998_eng._orof
.pdf; (3) Bahrain,Decree Law No. 11 Regarding the Protection of Antiquities, Ch. VI, Art.
47, 48 (1995) (Bahr.), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/bahr
ain/bahraindecree_1aw25_06_1995-angtof.pdf; (4) Cambodia, Law on the Protection of
Cultural Heritage, NS/RKIM0196/26, Ch. 1, Art. 40, 56, 63(a) (1996) (Cambodia), available
athttp://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/cambodia/cambodia roydecol9626Leng
tno.pdf; (5) Canada,Cultural Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-51 (Can.),
available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/canadacanadacult
ural-property-exportimportactengorof.pdf; (6) Cyprus, Antiquities Law, Ch. 31, Pt. III,
§ 14(2), Pt. VII, § 27(4) (2006) (Cyprus), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/nat
laws/medialpdf/cyprus/cy_1aw-antiquities-engtof.pdf; (7)DominicanRepublic,Law No. 564
(of September 27, 1973) on the Protection and Preservation of National Ethnological and
Archaeological Objects, Official Gazette No. 9315, Art. 10(a), (c) (1973), available at
httpJ/www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/dominicanrepublicrepdom_1aw564_engt
of.pdf; (8) Egypt, Law No. 117 of 1983 (The Issuance of Antiquities' Protection Law), AlJaridaAl-Rasmiyya, 11 Aug. 1983 (Egypt), availableat http://www.unesco.org/culture/nat
laws/medialpdflegypt/egypt_1awll7_1983_engtof.pdf; (9) India, The Ancient Monuments
and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, No. 24 of 1958, INDIA CODE (1958) (India),
available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/india/indeact24_1958-eno
rof; (10) Indonesia, Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of the Year 1992
Concerning Items of Cultural Property, Ch. IV, Art. 29-30, Ch. VIII, Art. 45(1) (1992)
(Indon.), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlawsmedia/pdflindonesieindon
esiacomilationof-Law_2003_englorof.pdf; (11) Iraq, Antiquities & Heritage of Iraq Law
No. 55 of 2002 (Iraq), available at http://www.cemml.colostate.edu/cultural/09476/pdflir
qantiquities-law-2002.pdf; (12) Ireland, National Monuments Act 1930 (Pub. State. No.
2/1930) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1930/en/act/pub/0002/print.html;
(13) Italy, Decreto Legislative 22 gennaio 2004, n. 42 (It.), available at httpf//www.unesco.

2014]

NATIONAL TREASURE

443

provide for periods of confinement but do not provide an independent

org/culture/natlaws/medialpdflitaly/it-cult_1andscapeheritge2004_engtof.pdf; (14) Japan,
Bunkaziihogohou [Law for the Protection of Cultural Property), Law No. 214 of 1950, art.
193 (Japan), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdfljapan/japan
law-protectionproperty entno.pdf; (15) Jordan,Law of Antiquities No. 21, Official Gazette
No. 4662, Art. 26(a) (1)-(2), (7) (2004) (Jordan), availableat http://www.unesco.org/culture
/natlaws/media/pdfljordan/jo-antiquitieslaw21 engtof.pdf; (16)Kuwait, Law ofAntiquities,
Princely Decree No. 11 of 1960, § 6, Art. 43 (Kuwait), availableat http://www.unesco.org
/culture/natlaws/media/pdflkuwait/kuw decree 11_lawantiquities engtof.pdf; (17) Mexico,
Ley Federal de Monumentos y Zonas Arqueol6gicos, Artisticos e Historicos [Federal Law
on Archaeological, Artistic and Historic Monuments and Areas], Art. 47, 49, Diario Oficial
de la Federaci6n [DO], 6 de mayo de 1972 (Mex.), available at http://www.unesco.org/cul
ture/natlaws/mediapdf/mexico/mexiquelegislative text_1972-engl-tno.pdf; (18) Norway,
Act of 9 June 1978 No. 50 Concerning the Cultural Heritage, Ch. VI, § 27 (Nor.), available
at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/doc/Laws/Acts/cultural-heritage-act.html?id=173106#;

(19)

Peru, Law Amending Articles 226 and 228 of the Criminal Code About Crimes Against
Cultural Property, Law No. 28567, Art. 228 (2005) (Peru), availableat http://www.unesco
.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/peru/per_1aw28567_engtof.pdf; (20) Poland,Act of 23 July
2003 on the Protection and Guardianship of Monuments, Journal of Law No. 03.162.1568,
Ch. 11, Art. 109 (2003) (Pol.), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/

pdf/poland/poland-act2302003 entof.pdf; (21) Saudi Arabia, Regulations for Antiquities,
Royal Decree No. M/26, 23 Jumada II 1392, Pt. VII, Art. 67, 69, 71 (1972) (Saudi Arabia),
available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/medialpdf/saudiarabialsaudiarabiaroyaldecreeantiquitiesl972_engtof.pdf; (22) Serbia, Law on Cultural Property, Official
Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 71, Ch. 11, Art. 130, 132, 134 (1994) (Serb.), available
at http-//www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/medialpdf/serbia/serbia_1awl994_engtof.pdf (23)
South Korea, Munhwa yusan beob [The Cultural Heritage Protection Act], Act No. 961,
January 10, 1962, amended by Act No. 8346, April 11, 2007 (S. Kor.), available at
http//www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdjlrepublicofkorea/repkorea culturalheritage
protectionact amended_2007-engtof.pdf; (24) Sweden, 3-5, 7(1), 12 § ACT ON PENALTIES FOR
SMUGGLING (Swedish Code of Statutes [SFS] 2000: 1225) (Swed.), availableat http://www.
government.se/content/1/c6/02/77/68/c656cb4d.pdf; 1 ch. 21 § HERITAGE CONSERVATION ACT
(Swedish Code of Statutes [SFS] 1988:950) (Swed.), available at http//www.unesco.org/
culture/natlaws/media/pdf/sweden/seordincehertgeconservatl998_engtno.pdf; (25) Switzerland, Bundesgesetz fiber den internationalen Kulturgiitertransfer [KGTG [Federal Act
on the International Transfer of Cultural Property], June 20, 2003, SR 444.1, art. 24
(Switz.), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/switzerland/ch act
intaltrsfertcultproties2005_engtno.pdf; (26) Thailand, Act on Ancient Monuments,
Antiques, Objects of Art and National Museums, B.E. 2504, Government Gazette, Vol. 78,
No. 66, Ch. 5, §§ 31, 37 (1961) (Thai.), availableat http-I/www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws
/media/pdf/thailande/thailande-act_1961_englorof.pdf; (27) Turkey, Legislation for the
Conservation of Cultural and Natural Property, Pt. 6, Art. 65 (Turk.), available at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlawshmedia/pdf/turkey/turk-legislation2863_conservation
culturalnaturalproperty-engtno.pdf; (28) United Kingdom, Dealing in Cultural Objects
(Offences) Act, 2003, c. 27, § 1 (U.K.), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaw
shmedia/pdf/gbgb dealingcultobjsoffences2003_engorof.pdf; (29) United States, Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d) (2012).
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legislative basis for fines." Ten of the forty-six countries impose only
fines without providing for confinement as a punishment for illicit
excavation or export.9 o

89. These five countries are the following: (1) Afghanistan, Law on the Protection of
Historical and Cultural Properties, Issue No. 828, Ch. 8, Art.. 74, 77 (2004) (Afg.), available
at http://www.cemml.colostate.edu/cultural/09476/pdflafghan-antiquities-law-2004.pdf; (2)
Argentina, Law No. 25.743, June 26, 2003, 30.170 B.O. 1 (Arg.), available at http://www.
unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/argentina/argentinaoi26 06_2003_engorof.pdf; (3)
Greece, Nomos (2002:3028) Gia tin prostasia ton Archaiotiton kai Politistikis KlironomiAs
sti Genikf [On the Protection of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage in General], 2002, Art.
61, 63 (Greece), availableat http//www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/medialpdffgreece/gre
law_3028_engtof.pdf; (4) Hungary, National Legislation for the Protection of Cultural
Heritage, Act No. 63 of 2001 on the protection of cultural heritage, Decree 17/2001 on
Restrictions to the Export of Cultural Objects (2001) (Hung.) (summarizing the situation
of heritage protection in Hungary), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/
media/pdf/hungary/hu textsummarizing.heritageprotection-engtof.pdf; (5) Romania, Law
no. 182 of 25th October 2000 Regarding the Protection of the Movable National Heritage,
Official Gazette No. 530, § Art. 69 (2000) (Rom.), available at http://www.unesco.orglcul
ture/natlaws/media/pdf/romania/romlaw_182_engtof.pdf.
90. These ten countries are the following: (1) Albania, Law on the Protection of
Immovable and Movable Cultural Property, Law Nr. 7691, Art. 30 (1992) (Alb.), available
at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/albania/albaniajloi-eng-orofpdf; (2)
Brazil, Lei No. 3.924, de 26 de Julho de 1961, DIAmo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
26.7.1961 (Braz.), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/medialpdf/ bre
sil/brazillei_3924_2607_1961 engtno.pdf; (3) Chad, Act No. 14-60 of 2 November 1960
for the Purpose of the Protection of Natural Monuments and Sites, Sites and Monuments
of a Prehistoric, Archaeological, Scientific, Artistic or Picturesque Character, the
Classification of Historical and Ethnographic Objects and the Regulation of Archaeological
Excavations, Act. No. 14-60, Tit. II, Art. 33, Tit. III, Art. 44, 46 (1960) (Chad), available at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/medialpdf/chad/chad-act_14 60_engtof.pdf; (4) Colombia, L. 1185, marzo 12, 2008, Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.), available at http://
www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/colombia/colombialeylll8_engtof.pdf;(5)Croatia, Act on the Protection and Preservation of Cultural Objects, 01-081-99-1280/2, Art. 115
(5), 116 (1999) (Croat.), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/
pdf/croatia/croatia act.protectionclturalgoods-engtof.pdf; (6) Ecuador,General Bylaws to
the Law of Cultural Patrimony, Executive Decree 2733, Official Registry 787, Ch. 9, Art.
73, 79 (1984) (Ecuador), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/medialpdf
/ecuador/ec..decretregltdecretregtl984_engtof.pdf; (7) Montenegro, Protection of Cultural
Property Act, Book No. 1 for 2010, Item No. 66, Art. 138 (2010) (Montenegro), availableat
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/montenegro/montenegro-protectioncul
turalpropertyactengtof.pdf; (8) New Zealand, Protected Objects Act 1975 (N.Z.), available
athttp//www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1975/0041/latest/DLM432116.html; (9) Slovenia,
Cultural Heritage Protection Act (ZVKD-1), Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia
16/2008, Art. 126 (1) (2008) (Slovn.), available at http-/www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws
/media/pdf/slovenia/slovenia culturalheritageact_2008-engtno.pdf; (10) Spain, Law 16/1985
dated 25 June, on the Spanish Historical Heritage (B.O.E. 1985) (Spain), available at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/medialpdf/spain/spa-law_16_1985_engtof.pdf.
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The forty-six national statutory schemes examined for this analysis
each necessarily define illicit excavation.9 ' Some of the statutes
describe how to legally excavate cultural objects-generally involving
obtaining a permit-then prescribe a penalty for persons who do not
follow this procedure." Many laws simply prohibit the act of excavating cultural materials, without providing further explanation." When
statutes do provide further detail on what constitutes excavation, these
explanations run the gamut from vague 94 to particular."
The statutory sections concerning illicit export are similar to those
concerning illicit excavation, in that many of them do not define what it
means to export cultural property. Most of the statutes used for this
research simply prohibit "export" of specific categories of cultural
material.96 Some use the terms "smuggling" or "trafficking"" instead of "exporting." When statutes do provide further detail on what
constitutes illicit exporting or smuggling, they again run the gamut from
vague" to detailed."oo
B. Observations on Maximum PotentialPeriods of Confinement for
Illicit Excavation and Exporting
Figure A-1 shows the maximum periods of confinement for illicit
excavation. The x-axis shows the countries ordered by their 2012
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ranking for per capita gross
domestic product (GDP). (Simplified, the left end of the x-axis has the
wealthier countries, while the right end of the x-axis shows countries
with fewer economic resources.) The y-axis shows the potential periods

91. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 88, at Art. 26; Montenegro, supra note 90, at Art.
138(1)(5).
92. See, e.g., Singapore, Preservation of Monuments Act, Act 45 of 1970, Chap. 315,
§§ 7(1), 17 (Jan. 29, 1971) (Sing.), available at httpJ/www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/me
dia/pdf/singapore/singapore-act-chap315_29_01_1971_engorof.pdf.
93. See, e.g., Norway, supra note 88, at § 83.
94. See, e.g., Bahamas, supra note 88, Pt. IV, § 12(a) (describing excavation as
"search[ing] for antiquities").
95. See, e.g., Bahrain, supra note 88, Ch. II, Art. 10 (describing excavation as "digging,
examining and investigation that aimis] at discovering movable and immovable antiquities
underground or on land or in water streams, pools, qanats or territorial sea").
96. See, e.g., id. at Art. 2, 3; Cambodia, supra note 88, at § 9, Art. 51.
97. E.g., Bahrain, supranote 88, at Ch. VI, Art. 47 (instituting a penalty for "[alnyone
who smuggled or took part in smuggling antiquity outside the country").
98. See, e.g., Iraq, supra note 88, at Art. 44.
99. See, e.g., Cambodia, supra note 88, at § 9, Art. 51 (prohibiting "the export of any
cultural object").
100. See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 90, at Ch. V, Art. 20 (prohibiting "transferr[ing]
(antiquities] abroad without [] express authorization").
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of confinement in years that each country's criminal cultural property
law allows, going up to ten years."o1 For the twenty-nine countries
that have laws providing for confinement for illicit excavation, the
potential periods of confinement range from one month 02 to ten
years.'o0 For some countries, such as South Korea, the term of imprisonment is accompanied by labor."0 " As Figure A-1 indicates, comparing these maximum periods of confinement reveals a tendency for more
resource-challenged countries to allow for harsher confinement terms as
punishment for the illicit excavation of archaeological resources.
The same trend exists in terms of potential periods of confinement for
illicit export of archaeological materials. Figure A-2 shows the maximum
periods of confinement for illicit export. As with Figure A-1, the x-axis
shows the countries ordered by their 2012 IMF ranking for per capita
GDP. The y-axis shows the potential periods of confinement in years
that each statute allows and goes up to twelve years. 05 For the
twenty-seven countries that have laws providing for confinement as
punishment for illicit export, the potential periods of confinement range
from one monthl'0 6 to twelve years.'
Figure A-3 compares the potential terms of confinement for illicit
excavation and export. In eight of the twenty-one countries that provide
for potential periods of confinement for either crime, illicit export is
punished more severely.'s In eleven countries, the maximum potential term of confinement is equal for both illicit excavation and export.'o 'In one country, Thailand, the potential maximum period of

101. All penalties for illicit excavation presented in this Article fall within this range.
102. See Figure A-1.
103. Id.
104. South Korea, supra note 88, at Art. 104(2).
105. As noted above with penalties for illicit excavation, all penalties for illicit export
presented in this Article fall within this range.
106. See, e.g., Norway, supra note 88, at § 27.
107. See, e.g., Mexico, supra note 88, at Art. 53.
108. The eight countries are the following: (1) Afghanistan, supra note 89, at Ch. 8, Art.
77; (2) Dominican Republic, supra note 88, at Art. 10 (a), (c); (3) Iraq, supra note 88; (4)
Italy, supra note 88; (5) Mexico, supra note 88; (6) Peru, supra note 88, at Art. 228; (7)
Romania, supra note 89, at Art. 69; (8) Sweden, ACT ON PENALTIES FOR SMUGGLING, supra
note 88, at 12, 13 §§, HERITAGE CONSERVATION ACT, supra note 88, at 1 Ch. 21 §, 5 Ch. 17
109. The eleven countries are the following: (1) Cambodia, supranote 88, at § 11, Art.
63; (2) Cyprus, supra note 88, at Pt. 111 (14), Pt. VII (4); (3) Greece, supra note 89; (4)
Jordan, supra note 88, at Art. 26; (5) Kuwait, supra note 88, at § 6, Art. 43; (6) Norway,
supra note 88, at § 27; (7) Saudi Arabia, supra note 88, at Art. 69; (8) South Korea, supra
note 88; (9) Switzerland, supra note 88, at § 9, Art. 24; (10) United Kingdom, supra note
88, at § 1; (11) United States, supra note 88.
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confinement for illicit excavation is actually longer than it is for illicit
export."x0
As Figure A-3 shows, in terms of confinement, the general trend is to
either punish illicit excavation and export equally or to punish illicit
export more severely."' This might be the case because looters are
often working-class people dealing in an occasional item, and they are
often, literally, putting food on the table for their families."' Meanwhile, wholesalers and traffickers who illicitly export as a matter of
course engage in the illicit antiquities trade as a business, enjoying
higher profits off the archaeological objects in which they trade and
making greater individual contributions to the illicit antiquities
trade. 113
It is worth noting that there is less of a difference in statutory
confinement penalties for illicit excavation and export in wealthier
nations than in developing nations.114 It appears that, in wealthier
nations, it is more likely that the criminal exposure for looting and
trafficking are the same. The Authors speculate that this is because, in
wealthier nations, the perception may be that there is less economic
disparity between illicit excavators and exporters. However, this issue
may be better fleshed out in a subsequent inquiry.
C. Observations on Maximum Allowable Fines for Illicit Excavation
and Export
Thirty-seven of the forty-six statutory schemes examined gave an
independent basis for the imposition of fines as punishment for cultural
property crimes. These thirty-seven statutes varied tremendously in not
only the amount of the fine imposed, but also in the method used to
calculate the fines.
Of the thirty-seven fine systems examined, twenty-seven have
maximum fines."' Maximum fines are indicated within the text of the

110. Thailand, supra note 88, at Ch. 5 §§ 31, 38.
111. See, e.g., Cyprus, supranote 88, at Pt. 3, § 14(2); Pt. 7, § 27(4); Mexico, supranote
88, at Ch. 6, Art. 47, 53.
112. See Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 606.
113. See id. at 615-17.
114. Compare, e.g., Switzerland, supra note 88, at § 9, Art. 24, with Romania, supra
note 89, at Art. 67, 69.
115. These countries are: (1) Albania, supra note 90, at Art. 30; (2) Australia, supra
note 88, at pt II div 1 para 9 (3B); (3) Bahamas, supra note 88, at Pt. VII (33) (b), (e); (4)
Bahrain, supra note 88, at Ch. VI, Art. 47, 48; (5) Brazil, supra note 90; (6) Canada, supra
note 88; (7) Colombia, supranote 90; (8) Croatia, supra note 90; (9) Cyprus, supra note 88,
at Pt. III (2), Pt. VII (4); (10) Dominican Republic, supra note 88, at Art. 10(a), (c); (11)
Egypt, supra note 88; (12) Iraq, supra note 88; (13) Ireland, supra note 88, Pt. 1, § 24(3);
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statute itself."6 An example of a maximum fine can be found in the
Archaeological Resources Protection Act, a United States cultural
property statute, which provides: "Any person who knowingly violates,
or counsels, procures, solicits, or employs any other person to violate,
any prohibition contained in subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section
shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000. . . .""n
Of the remaining eleven fine systems,"' three base the fine on the
value of the object involved in the offense,' four base the fine on
variables unrelated to the value of the object involved,120 and four
simply state the possibility that fines may be imposed.121 In all three
countries that have maximum potential penalties based on the value of
the archaeological object that was the subject of the illicit act, the fine
is twice the value of the object.12 2 The four statutory schemes that
presented alternative fine systems unrelated to the value of the object
involved based maximum fines upon "vital minimum wages,"12
"minimum legal monthly salaries,"124 "fine-days,"'25 and the "amount
of the minimum earnings [of the country]."126

The remaining four

countries did not specify a maximum or means of determining the fine,

(14) Italy, supra note 88, at Ch. I, Art. 174; (15) Japan, supra note 88; (16) Kuwait, supra
note 88, at § 6, Art. 43; (17) Mexico, supra note 88, at Art. 53; (18) New Zealand, supra
note 90; (19) Saudi Arabia, supra note 88, at Art. 67, 69, 71; (20) Serbia, supra note 88, at
Art. 130; (21) Slovenia, supra note 90, at Art. 126; (22) South Korea, supra note 88, at Art.
104; (23) Spain, supra note 90, at Art. 76; (24) Switzerland, supra note 88, at § 9, Art. 24;
(25) Thailand, supra note 88, at Ch. 5 §§ 31, 37; (26) Turkey, supra note 88, at Art. 68, 74;
(27) United States, supra note 88.
116. See, e.g., Kuwait, supranote 88, at Art. 43; Saudi Arabia, supra note 88, at Art.
67.
117. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d).
118. Cambodia, supra note 88; Chad, supra note 90; Ecuador, supra note 90; Iraq,
supra note 88; Montenegro, supra note 90; Norway, supra note 88; Peru, supra note 88;
Poland, supra note 88; Sweden, supra note 88; United Kingdom, supra note 88.
119. Cambodia, supra note 88, at Art. 63; Chad, supra note 90, at Art. 44; Iraq, supra
note 88, at Art. 42.
120. Colombia, supra note 90, at Art. 10(1); Ecuador, supra note 90, at Art. 79;
Montenegro, supra note 90, at Art. 138(2); Peru, supra note 88, at Art. 228.
121. Norway, supra note 88, at § 27; Poland, supranote 88, at Art. 109; Sweden, supra
note 88, at § 21; United Kingdom, supra note 88, at (3).
122. Cambodia, supra note 88, at § 11, Art. 63; Chad, supra note 90, at Art. 47; Iraq,
supra note 88, Ch. 6, Art. 38.
123. Ecuador, supra note 90, at Ch. 9, Art. 79; Donna MacIsaac & Martin Rama,
DeterminantsofHourly Earningsin Ecuador: The Role ofLaborMarket Regulations,15 J.
Labor Econ., 8136, 8138-39 (1997).
124. Colombia, supra note 90, at Art. 15.
125. Peru, supra note 88, at Art. 228.
126. Montenegro, supra note 90, at Art. 138.
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even though the statutes specified one could be imposed."' These
statutes presumably leave this determination to the court's discretion.
Figure A-4 shows the maximum allowable fines-in United States
(U.S.) dollars-for illicit excavation under the examined criminal
cultural property laws. The x-axis, as before, is ordered by the 2012
IMF ranking for per capita GDP, with wealthier nations on the left and
resource-challenged nations on the right. The y-axis shows the
maximum potential fine for illicit excavation of archaeological materials
for each country. The y-axis goes up to $200,000.00. The maximum
permitted fines range from $2.02128 to $189,773.47.129 As might be
expected, the maximum fines tend to be lower in countries with a lowerper-capita GDP.
To create a meaningful comparison, the Authors chose to represent the
fines for all countries shown in Figure A-4 in U.S. dollars. This required
converting the currency from twenty-five statutes."o These currencies
were converted directly to U.S. dollars from the currency listed in the
statute, even where the listed currency is now obsolete.131 Four of the
statutes, those of Ireland,132 Spain, 33 Italy, 34 and Cyprus,'3 rely
on currency that is now obsolete. All four of these countries currently
use the euro; however, their statutes list their respective past currencies.13' For purposes of converting listed fines to U.S. dollars, the
Authors converted the amounts for these countries from the obsolete
currency, rather than the euro. The converted penalty amounts were

127. Norway, supra note 88, at § 27; Poland, supra note 88, at Art. 109; Sweden, ACT
ON PENALTIES FOR SMUGGLING, supra note 88, at 3, 7 §§ & HERITAGE CONSERVATION ACT

supra note 88, at 1 ch. 21 §; United Kingdom, supra note 88, at § 1.
128. Italy, supra note 88.
129.
130.

Spain, supra note 90.
Fines from Switzerland were converted from the Swiss Franc, Kuwait from the

Gulf Rupee, Ireland from the Irish Pound, Slovenia from the Euro, Cyprus from the Cypriot
Pound, Bahrain from the Bahraini Dinar, Saudi Arabia from the Saudi Arabian Riyal,
Croatia from the Croatian Kuna, Mexico from the Mexican Peso, Turkey from the Turkish
Lira, Indonesia from the Rupiah, Brazil from the Brazilian Cruzerio, Serbia from the
Yugoslav Dinar, Thailand from the Thai Baht, Dominican Republic from the Dominican
Peso, Albania from the Albanian Lek, Egypt from the Egyptian Pound, Jordan from the
Jordanian Dinar, Iraq from the Iraqi Dinar, India from the Indian Rupee, and Chad from
the CFA Franc.
131. Amounts were converted online in September of 2012 using a currency conversion
site. XE CURRENCY CONVERTER, http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/.
132. Ireland, supra note 88.
133. Spain, supra note 90.
134. Italy, supra note 88.
135. Cyprus, supra note 88, at Pt. VII, § 4.
136. See Cypress, supra note 88, at § 26(7) (pound); Ireland, supra note 88, at § 24(3)
(pound); Spain, supra note 90, at Art. 76 (peseta).
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current at the time of writing; however, it is the nature of exchange
rates to remain in flux.
Figure A-5 shows the maximum fines for the illicit export of archaeological materials. The x-axis remains the same, while the y-axis now
goes up to a maximum fine of $800,000.00.137 As was with the case
with looting, the maximum fines appear to decrease in rough proportion
to the countries' per capita GDP. The maximum permitted fines range
from $17.97138 to $759,064.57'39. The twenty-five countries represented in Figure A-5 are those that provide a fine of a flat amount.
The remaining eight countries are not represented in Figure A-5.
Montenegro, Colombia, and Ecuador impose fines based on national
wages. 140 Failing to report an archeological find in Montenegro results
in a fine of "twentyfold to two hundredfold [of the] amount of the
minimum earnings in Montenegro."' 41 In Colombia, the penalty for
illicit export is between 5 and 500 minimum legal monthly salaries. 142
In Ecuador, the penalty for illicit export is "four to a hundred vital
minimum wages." 4 3 Such statutes appear to refer to the national
minimum wage.'44
Meanwhile, Cambodia, Chad, and Guatemala impose fines based on
the value of the archaeological object. For each country, the specified
fine is twice the value of the object at issue.14 ' The Cambodian
antiquities law states that the fine for the illicit excavation or export of
Cambodian antiquities is "equal to two times the value of the object in
question."'4 6 It further provides that the value shall be determined by
expert opinion. 4 7 The antiquities law of Chad does not indicate how
the value of the object is to be determined.'
The Guatemalan law
indicates that the value of the cultural property shall be established by
the General Direction of Cultural and Natural Patrimony.4 '

137. No fines exceed this amount.
138. Kuwait, supra note 88, at § 6, Art. 43.
139. Spain, supra note 90.
140. Colombia, supra note 90; Montenegro, supra note 90, at Art. 138; Ecuador, supra
note 90, at Ch. 9, Art. 73, 79.
141. Montenegro, supra note 90, at Art. 138.
142. Colombia, supra note 90.
143. Ecuador, supra note 90, at Ch. 9, Art. 79.
144. Id.; MacIsaac & Rama, supra note 123.
145. Cambodia, supra note 88, at § 11, Art. 63; Chad, supra note 90, at Art. 44;
Guatemala, Law for the Protection of the Cultural Patrimony of the Nation Decree Number
26-97, Ch. X, Art. 45.
146. Cambodia, supra note 88, at § 11, Art. 63.
147. Id.
148. Chad, supra note 90, at Art. 44.
149. Guatemala, supra note 145, at Ch. X, Art. 45.
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Three countries-Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom-did not
specify a maximum fine or means of determining the fine.150 The
respective statutes for these countries simply specified that fines would
be imposed. 5 1 This type of statute gives the courts discretion in
deciding what kind of fine to impose, and they may base it on the crime,
the defendant, or other aggravating or mitigating factors.' 5 2
In terms of fines, the general trend is either to punish illicit excavation and export equally or to punish illicit export more severely.'
As
with confinement trends, this might be the case because criminal
excavators are often low-income people dealing in an occasional item,
and they are often working to feed their families.1 54 Meanwhile,
wholesalers and traffickers who illicitly export as a matter of course are
engaging in the illicit antiquities trade as a business, enjoying higher
profits made off of the archaeological objects in which they trade and
making greater individual contributions to the illicit antiquities
trade.15
Also similar to the trends for terms of confinement, there is less of a
difference in statutory fines for illicit excavation and export in wealthier
nations than in developing nations.'5 ' There is again a higher probability that the criminal exposure for looting and excavating are the same
in wealthier nations."' The Authors speculate that this trend occurs
because there may be a perception in wealthier nations that there is less
economic disparity between illicit excavators and exporters.
D. Relationship Between Confinement & Fines
Whether a country punishes those involved in the illicit antiquity
distribution ladder through fines, confinement, or both, the general
trends remain the same. Most often, countries will either punish illicit
excavation and export equally or punish illicit export more severely than

150. Norway, supra note 88, at § 27; Sweden, ACT ON PENALTIES FOR SMUGGLING,
supra note 88, at 3, HERITAGE CONSERVATION ACT, supra note at 88, at 1 ch. 21 §; United

Kingdom, supra note 88, at § 1.
151. See Norway, supranote 88, at § 27; Sweden, AcT ON PENALTIES FOR SMUGGLING,
supra note 88, at 3, 7(1), 12 §; Heritage Conservation Act, supra note 88, at 1 Ch. 21 §;
United Kingdom, supra note 88, at § 1.
152.

See, e.g., Sweden, ACT ON PENALTIES FOR SMUGGLING, supra note 88, at

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See, e.g., Italy, supra note 88, at Art. 169, Art. 174.
See Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 606.
See id. at 615-17.
Compare, e.g., United States, supra note 88, with Chad, supra note 90.
See, e.g., Cyprus, supra note 88, at 14, 27(4).

§§

4, 7.
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When confinement is the penalty, the length of
illicit excavation.'
confinement is greatest for the most resource-challenged nations and is
Conversely, when the penalty is
lowest for the wealthiest nations.'
a fine, the value of the fine in U.S. dollars is the greatest in the
wealthier nations and the lowest in the more resource-challenged
nations.'6 0 These trends should be considered against the backdrop
that those who commit criminal excavation tend to be poor, while those
who commit criminal export tend to be less economically challenged.161
A comparison of the maximum periods of confinement for illicit
excavation versus illicit export reveals that the relative difference in
statutory confinement penalties for illicit export and excavation is
smaller in wealthier nations, while greater in more resource-challenged
nations.162 In other words, it appears that in wealthier nations the
criminal exposure for illicit export and excavation is about the same,
while in developing nations the criminal exposure for illicit export is
notably greater than the criminal exposure for illicit excavation.163
The disparity in developing nations appears to complement the ethical
considerations that illicit excavators are less morally culpable for their
actions because many of them are motivated by poverty, tend to have a
stronger cultural connection to the objects, and often receive a mere
pittance for their finds.'
Alternatively, those who illicitly export
objects are more morally culpable and make much more profit from their
part in the illicit antiquities ladder.
Figure A-6' compares the value of the maximum fines in U.S.
dollars to each nation's per capita gross domestic product (GDP). This
figure reveals that, even though the amount of the fines themselves are
higher in wealthier nations, the statutory fines are relatively more
expensive in resource-challenged nations.' 6 The difference in the
value of the statutory fine for export versus excavation is wider in the

158. Compare, e.g., Switzerland, supranote 88, at Art. 24, with Turkey, supra note 88,
at Art. 68, 74.
159. Compare, e.g., Mexico, supra note 88, at Art. 47, 53, with the United States, supra
note 88, at 470ee(d).
160. See Figure A-4; compare, e.g., Chad, supra note 90, at Art. 46, 47, with Spain,
supra note 90, at Art. 76.
161. See Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 606.
162. See Figure A-3.
163. See Figure A-3; Compare, e.g., United States, supra note 88, at 470ee(d), with
Chad, supra note 90.
164. See Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 606-07.
165. Although the y-axis only goes to $100,000, the maximum fines for three countries,
Switzerland, Spain, and Egypt, exceed this cap.
166. See Figure A-1.
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Accordingly, in resource-challenged
resource-challenged nations.'
nations, the financial exposure for illicitly exporting cultural property is
relatively greater than the same exposure in the wealthier nations.s68
Even where the statutory fines are larger for wealthier nations, this does
Many of those
not necessarily create an effective deterrence."'
involved in the illicit antiquities trade in wealthier nations either have
the funds to simply pay the fine without consequence or to hire
sophisticated defense attorneys to have the fine reduced or eliminated.170
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Authors do not purport that the research contained within this
Article constitutes an exhaustive inquiry into domestic statutory
schemes aimed at thwarting the illicit excavation and export of
antiquities. Rather, the Authors hope that this research will provide the
basis for meaningful discourse on the ethical dilemmas related to the
ways in which participants in the illicit antiquities trade are punished.
Moreover, this research may provide a platform for designing and
implementing more effective and ethical statutes in the fight against the
illicit antiquity trade.
There is a clear socioeconomic disparity inherent within the illicit
antiquities distribution ladder."7 ' Examining the domestic criminal
legislation in forty-six countries reveals that this disparity is at times
magnified by domestic legislation criminalizing the illicit excavation and
export of antiquities. The overarching problem is that, despite this
legislation, marginalized creator cultures continue to unearth antiquities
for which there remains a bustling market abroad. 7 2
The trade in illicit antiquities will likely continue to thrive under the
current statutory schemes. The cultures that are punished most
drastically will continue to reoffend in order to feed their families."'
Those who arguably fuel the trade through high-dollar purchases of
illicit antiquities will fail to be deterred due to access to the resources
necessary to minimize or eliminate any potential criminal exposure."

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See Figure A-1.
See, e.g., Serbia, supra note 88, at Art. 130, 132-33.
See Figure A-1.
See, e.g., Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 622-23.
See generally id. at 606, 608, 622.
See generally Szopa, supra note 65, at 58-59.
See generally Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves, supra note 2, at 606.
See generally Finchman, supra note 74, at 633.
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Figure A-1
Maximum Periods of Confinement for Looting by IMF Ranking

10
9
8
7

4
32
1 -

-

00

gggMaximum Period of Confinement for Looting (Years)
-

Linear (Maximum Period of Confinement for Looting (Years))

20141

NATIONAL TREASURE

455

Data Fields for Figure A-1
International
Monetary Fund
Ranking

Country
4 Norway
7 United States
8
12

Switzerland

Maximum Period of
Confinement for
Looting (Years)
0.5
2
I

Kuwait

I

13 Sweden

0.5

15

Ireland

22 United Kingdom
25 South Korea
27 Bahamas
29

31
33
34
39
46
51
63
64
69
73
79
83
86
87
104
107
129
147
172

Italy

Cyprus
Greece
Bahrain
Saudi Arabia
Hungary
Argentina
Mexico
Turkey
Iran
Romania
Serbia
Peru
Thailand
Dominican Republic
Egypt
Jordan
India
Cambodia
Afghanistan

1

0.5
10
1
I

3
10
7
2
0
1
10
5
5
7
0.5
6
2
0.25
7
3
2
8
0.25

456

[Vol. 65

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Figure A-2

Maximum Periods of Confinement for Exporting by IMF Ranking
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Data Fields for Figure A-2
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Figure A-3
Comparison Maximum Periods of Confinement for Looting and Exporting by
IMF Ranking
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Data Fields for Figure A-3
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Figure A-4
Maximum Fine for Looting (U.S. Dollars) by IMF Ranking
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Data Fields for Figure A-4
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Figure A-5
Maximum Fine (U.S. Dollars) for Exporting by IMF Ranking
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Data Fields for Figure A-5
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Figure A-6
Comparison of Maximum Fine (U.S. Dollars) for Looting and Exporting by
IMF Ranking
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Data Fields for Figure A-6
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